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Following the Office of Fair Trading’s review of the British deregulated bus market as a whole 
in 2009, the issues raised were referred to the Competition Commission. Its final report was 
published in December 2011. Subsequently, the House of Commons Transport Committee 
carried out an enquiry into the Commission’s report, and reactions to it by the operating 
industry, user groups, and other bodies, which was published in September 2012.  A number 
of major issues have been raised, including the extent to which price competition may be 
effective, the appropriate rate of return on capital that would be expected within the industry 
(and appropriate actions where this is excessive in practice), and industry structure. The 
importance of competition per se, as distinct from attributes of direct concern to users (such 
as reliability, frequency, fares) has also been debated. This paper reviews the issues raised, 
and outcomes to date, in the light of further evidence on the industry’s performance. It is 
demonstrated similar rates of return could be attained through very different operating 
strategies, which in turn have very different implications for changes in consumer surplus. 
The alternative uses made of such profits (for example through reinvestment) may also have 
markedly different impacts effects on users. Rather than focussing on the dangers of 
excessive rates of return on capital, the outcomes for service users should be the main 
issue. 
Developments in Britain prior to the recent competition debate
In previous papers at a number of ‘Thredbo’ conferences - beginning with the first in 1989 – I 
have outlined developments in the deregulated coach and bus sectors in Britain. Many other 
writers on this subject have indicated a range of views on probable outcomes and those 
observed. This introductory section highlights the main changes.
1.1The express coach case
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The deregulation of long-distance coach services under the Transport Act of 1980 took place 
from October of that year. The quality of statistics is unfortunately very poor, but some broad 
conclusions can be drawn. Following removal of previous quantity controls (route and 
timetable licensing, also direct capacity controls), and those on price, which had protected 
both the railways and incumbent coach operators, rapid growth took place. The major 
operator, National Express (NE), increased ridership by about 50% between 1980 and 1986, 
in addition to which growth was attained by new entrant operators, albeit probably relatively 
small. Fares fell sharply, especially on the major trunk routes. In addition to coach users, rail 
users may also have benefitted through fare reductions made in response. However, the 
major competition was between National Express and British Rail, both then in state 
ownership, rather than within the coach market itself. Difficulties in obtaining access to 
terminal facilities used by incumbent operators were undoubtedly a factor in the limited 
impact of new entrants in the early 1980s Initial impacts are described and analysed by 
Robbins and White (1986), Kilvington and Cross (1986), and Thompson and Whitfield 
(1986).
From this initial peak, some reductions took place in NE ridership, as a result of substantial 
real fares increases, especially following privatisation in the form a management-employee 
buyout in 1988. The outcome was broadly consistent with a short-run price elasticity of about 
-1.0, i.e. total revenue remained largely unchanged in real terms. Little new entrant 
completion was generated in response to this and a reversal of pricing policy appears to 
have been associated as much with a change in management following incorporation of NE 
as a plc in the early 1990s. NE absorbed many of the competing independents, and only on 
one major corridor (Somerset - London) has all-year-round independent competition been 
sustained.. Increased emphasis was placed by NE on direct services to airports (notably 
Heathrow) where coach has a competitive advantage over rail, and is not in the ‘inferior 
mode’ position found in respect of trunk routes to city centres. Substantial competition re-
emerged for NE from Megabus (a subsidiary of Stagecoach) from 2003, adopting a yield 
management/ internet booking pricing system. These subsequent developments to 2010 are 
summarised in White and Robbins (2012). NE’s long-distance coach traffic has remained 
broadly stable in recent years, and consistently profitable despite growing competition from 
Megabus.
In brief, two broader conclusions may be drawn from the express case:
1. Contrary to some economic theory, impacts of small independents were limited. 
Although direct economies of a scale in service operation may be limited, network 
and marketing advantages undoubtedly exist. The only substantial competition in 
recent years has come from another large company.
2. While direct ‘on the road’ competition may be a factor in pricing, it is not necessarily 
the only one, and awareness by management of the negative impacts of successive 
real price increases could also explain behaviour.
1.2The first phase of local bus deregulation
It is convenient to divide the impacts of local bus deregulation into two phases:
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(a) From its inception in October 1986, following the Transport Act of 1985, to the year 
1999/2000, encompassing the initial phase of competition, and dramatic reduction in 
unit cost per bus-km, but with a sharp drop in ridership outside London.
(b) From 2000/1 inclusive, in which real costs per bus-km have risen (although still below 
1985/86 levels), and the aggregate rate of ridership decline has diminished.
Outside London and Northern Ireland, operators were required to register those services 
they considered ‘commercial’ (i.e. covering all costs from user revenues, including the then 
fuel duty rebate and any compensation received for concessionary fares). About 80% of total 
bus-km run outside London has operated in this form since. The remaining 20% share was 
taken by services contracted to local authorities, where commercial operation was not 
registered. In addition to obvious cases such as low-density rural routes, this also covered a 
substantial part of the day and week on routes otherwise registered as ‘commercial’ (for 
example evenings and Sundays). Hence, one might find two separate operators on the same 
route, both commercial and contracted, dependent on time period.
The perceived threat of competition ‘on the road’, and direct competition in the case of bids 
for contracted services, helped to stimulate a very sharp reduction in real total cost per bus-
km for the industry as a whole (including London). This had reached about 45% by 
1999/2000 (on a base of 1985/86, i.e. the last full year before deregulation), explained by 
increased labour productivity (notably through reductions in administrative and engineering 
staff), some reductions in wages and working conditions, higher vehicle utilisation, and use of 
smaller vehicles (Heseltine and Silcock 1990).  
However, this was not translated into a corresponding reduction in costs per passenger trip 
in the deregulated regions, since average loads fell by a similar percentage to unit cost per 
bus-km. While ridership might have been expected to grow as a result of higher bus-km 
operated (and certainly did so in some cases such as high-frequency minibus conversion), 
the aggregate impact was affected by an unstable network structure, and offset by 
substantial real fares increases. Some of these were due to removal of high support levels in 
the former metropolitan counties, but also occurred in other areas - there was no aggregate 
effect of price competition in reducing price levels. Rising car ownership and other external 
factors would also have affected ridership in any case. The result was very poor average 
loads.  The National Travel Survey (NTS) can be used to estimate changes in bus trip rates 
by car availability – in non-car owning households trip rate per person remained about the 
same (i.e. real fare and service level changes offset one another), but for those with cars 
available the bus trip rate fell even below that found in 1985/86 (White 1997, table 1).
The outcomes of direct competition on service quality, fares levels and ridership were highly 
variable and have been debated by many authors: (see, for example: Gomez-Ibanez and 
Meyer 1997; Preston 2003).
Evans (1990) and Van der Veer (2002) indicates that much competition may have taken the 
form of increased frequency, rather than lower fares, partly as tactic by incumbent operators 
to deter entry to newcomers.  
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Following an intensive phase of ‘on the road’ competition in the late 1980s, this diminished 
rapidly, and in many areas is now non-existent (the main exception being Oxford). Periodic 
competition occurs in some areas, but is not necessarily sustained.
The reductions in unit costs, and increases in fares, enabled substantial reductions to be 
made in the net level of financial support received by the industry. This was most marked in 
London, where the drop in costs while retaining ridership enabled net support (after 
concessionary fare compensation) to be virtually eliminated in 1999/2000.
1.3 The second phase of local bus deregulation
Taking 1999/2000 as the base, a different overall pattern emerges. A lower rate of overall 
ridership decline in the industry as a whole has been observed. This was assisted by very 
strong growth in London offsetting decline elsewhere, and also by the extension of 
concessionary travel for older and disabled users. From 2001 a nationwide minimum 
standard of a half fare was imposed, in place of a wide range of local authority policies 
applying previously. Subsequently, a far more generous scheme was introduced, of free 
travel after the morning peak period, initially by the devolved administrations in Scotland and 
Wales, and then subsequently in England from 2006. This clearly stimulated ridership 
growth, especially in areas which had offered less generous concessions previously (notably 
England outwith London and the Metropolitan areas), although this effect has probably 
reached its full extent, and decline has resumed in recent years, notably in Wales and 
Scotland. Within England, London’s continued growth has offset aggregate decline 
elsewhere such that aggregate industry ridership still rose (DfT 2014).  
In some areas there has also been substantial growth in non-concessionary (i.e. fare-paying) 
ridership, notably where operators have pursued more supportive marketing and service 
quality policies, such as Brighton & Hove, the Nottingham area, and Cambridge. In many 
cases these are also areas where car use may be constrained by the high-density nature of 
the area, such constraints being reinforced by local authority policies – for example, in 
historic university cities there may be strong pressure to limit total traffic growth for 
environmental reasons.
Industry profitability also improved substantially from the late 1990s, enabling a return to 
‘normal’ levels of fleet replacement (typically a 15 to 16 year life for full-sized vehicles). 
Profitability is typically measured as ‘Earnings before Interest and Taxation’ (EBIT), which 
may be easily expressed as a return of sales (RoS) margin as percentage of turnover. 
However, normal accounting practice in Britain is to charge only historic depreciation as a 
cost before calculating EBIT. Hence, while a cash flow is generated from historic 
depreciation, this will be insufficient to enable like-for-like replacement of vehicles and other 
assets at current prices. A higher margin (used in part to fund renewal investment, as well as 
returns to owners) will be necessary, or alternatives such as raising additional capital, or 
leasing rather than vehicle purchase (but the latter would be incurred as an annual operating 
cost in subsequent years, reducing future EBIT).
London in particular has displayed exceptionally strong growth, especially in the early 2000s, 
associated with a large increase in bus-km run. Population growth, and, to a lesser extent, 
congestion charging, are among the other principal factors. Estimates of the components of 
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this growth were provided by the author at the 2007 Thredbo conference and subsequently 
published in revised form (White 2009)1. The London growth has also been associated with 
very high levels of net financial support (i.e. additional to BSOG and concessionary fare 
compensation), which rose from £1 million in 1999/2000 to £532m in 2002/03, peaking at 
£792m in 2008/09, then falling to £500m in 2012/132, at 2011/12 prices.
While the ridership trends since 1999/2000 may in general be seen in a more positive light, 
those for real unit costs per bus-km reversed. Establishing a fully-consistent data series is 
difficult due to discontinuities in data published by DfT, but it can be shown that the industry-
wide average rose in real terms by 28% between 1999/2000 and 2006/07 (including 
London), and by 22% between 2004/05 and 2012/133 (excluding London). In aggregate, unit 
costs are now about 30-35% higher than in 1999/2000. However, bear in mind that this rise 
took place from a low base. For example, an operator with cost index of 100 in 1985/86 
would have one of 55 in 1999/2000 (on a drop of 45%). Even if this grew by 40% by 2012/13, 
the resultant index is about 77, i.e. still well below the 1985/86 level.
Increases in costs were probably inevitable, given the need to improve wages and working 
conditions of staff (especially in London), and external factors (such as fuel and insurance). 
In some cases, growing congestion (and the need to improve service reliability in the light of 
stricter monitoring by the Traffic Commissioners) has required more vehicles and drivers to 
be scheduled to provide a given service frequency (i.e. for the same volume of bus-km). This 
change also affected cost per passenger trip, reinforcing the importance of average loads.  
A continued trend toward consolidation in the industry can be seen. Very few of the 
management/employee buy-outs from NBC or SBG privatisations survive (the main 
examples being Wellglade - the holding company for Trentbarton - and East Yorkshire). 
Further examples have occurred of smaller municipals, and some larger rural independents, 
being absorbed into major groups. 
Some significant changes were introduced by the Local Transport Act 2008. This made it 
easier to introduce ‘Quality Contact Schemes’ (QCSs), which had first been specified in the 
Transport Act 2000. In essence, they would operate in a similar manner to the London 
contracting system, in other parts of mainland Britain. However, none has been introduced to 
date, although substantial interest has been shown by a number of Integrated Transport 
Authorities, notably Tyne and Wear. The Act also enabled local, voluntary agreements to be 
created, in which a limited degree of timetable and pricing co-ordination is permitted, in 
marked contrast to the emphasis on competition in the 1985 Act. A number of examples 
have been introduced, the most noteworthy of which is in Oxford4. The earlier aspects of this 
are summarised in White (2011).
2 Competition policy issues
2.1 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) study
Until their merger as the ‘Competition and Markets Authority’ (C&MA) in 2014, there were 
two main bodies involved in competition policy in Britain, the Office of Fair Trading 
(hereinafter, OFT), and the Competition Commission (hereinafter CC), the latter having 
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succeeded the Monopolies Commission. The OFT undertook the first stage in any inquiries, 
and then had scope to refer the matter to the full Competition Commission for further 
investigation and action. In the bus and coach sector, a number of inquiries took place in the 
earlier years of deregulation, primarily associated with allegations of unfair competition, and 
whether certain proposed mergers should be approved. The latter category became less 
numerous in the early 2000s, although a number have taken place in more recent years, 
notably in relation to the Stagecoach acquisitions of the Preston and Eastbourne municipal 
undertakings (approving the latter, but requiring divestment in the first): for a summary see 
White (2011). The OFT also examined a number of recent mergers, some of relatively small 
scale, but generally permitted these to go ahead.
Competition bodies also have powers to investigate entire market sectors, rather than 
specific firms, through ‘Market investigations’. One such was announced by the OFT in 2009 
(OFT 2009), looking at the entire local bus industry outside London. The OFT considered 
there were grounds for further investigation and possible action, referring the matter to the 
CC in January 2010 (OFT 2010).
The CC subsequently carried out a very extensive inquiry, the final report of which was 
published in December 2011 (CC 2011a). This in turn was reviewed by many industry 
commentators, and by the House of Commons Transport Committee, which reported in 
September 2012 (House of Commons Transport Committee 2012a).
The OFT’s report raised a number of concerns, including:
- The marked concentration of ownership in the industry, with about 70% of turnover 
controlled by the five largest groups (First, Stagecoach, Arriva, Go Ahead and 
National Express)
- The limited degree ‘on the road’ competition, following the higher level immediately 
after deregulation in 1986
- The associated limited extent of price competition (work for the OFT suggested that 
fares were on average 9% higher in areas where competition was not found)
- Whether the market for tendered services (based on competitive bidding) was 
working effectively.
The OFT took a fairly narrow remit, focussing wholly on competition within the local bus 
industry, i.e. excluding competition between buses and other modes (such as taxis), and also 
excluding the situations in London and Northern Ireland, as did the subsequent CC study, 
since there were ‘no issues of concern’ (one might observe that if matters were as good as 
thereby assumed, it would be worth examining their experiences in more detail to see how 
relevant they might be to the deregulated regions).  In respect of pricing competition the OFT 
did note that its scope was limited in the local bus market by the (logical) tendency of bus 
users to board the first bus to arrive rather than wait for a cheaper service.
2.2The Competition Commission study
The CC undertook a very extensive study (the final report comprising over 500 pages, 
excluding appendices). A provisional findings report was published in May 2011 (CC 2011a) 
and a final report in December (CC 2011b). This involved commissioned research, for 
example, a fresh analysis of values for price elasticity (Molnar and Nesheim 2010), which 
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derived an aggregate price elasticity of -0.36, very close to the average value of about -0.4  
found in earlier research (Balcombe et al  2004). It concurred with the OFT’s findings in 
respect of market concentration, and concern re lack of competition, but did not endorse the 
specific findings in respect of price levels and competition.
It focussed in particular on the high rates of return on capital enjoyed by the five biggest 
groups, resulting in ‘Adverse Effects on Competition’ (AECs). After assessing the value of 
assets owned (a complex question in its own right), it concluded that, over the period 2005-
06 to 2009-10, the average return was 13.5%, compared with a reference cost of capital of 
9.7%, suggesting an excess return of 3.8 percentage points. A number of actions were then 
proposed to reduce this excess return, and return benefits to users.  However, the report 
does not appear to investigate how these excessive profits were generated, or used. Were 
they the outcome of exploiting a market with a low short-run price elasticity, or innovations in 
service quality and marketing which stimulated greater ridership? Were they paid out as 
higher dividends, or reinvested, for example? These questions might point to looking at 
variations between the performance of the different groups, rather than considering them as 
a whole.
It is also of interest to note that the CC seriously considered competitive contracting as a 
policy option in its earlier reports, but had dropped this by the time of its provisional decision 
on remedies in October 2011.
The CC’s final report identified a number of ‘remedies’ including:
- Greater use of multi-operator ticketing, with additional powers for Local Transport 
Authorities to determine characteristics of such schemes
- Greater transparency in the bidding process for tendered services (an oddity of the 
current process for net cost tenders is that an incumbent who deregisters a 
commercial service is not obliged to disclose the revenue received, and thus has an 
advantage in being a bidder for a subsequent net cost contract)
- Requirements for operators to provide fair access to bus stations for rival operators
- Measures to stimulate greater competition, including restrictions on changes in 
service frequency through increases in registration notice periods, and changes to 
‘frequent’ service registrations (limiting scope for incumbents to react to competition)
- The OFT to take a tougher approach to bus company mergers
The only legislative aspect to have been implemented to date is that related to bus station 
access, under the Local Bus Services Market Investigation (Access to Bus Stations) Order 
2012, which took effect in January 2013. A number of operators had  already set out by 
December 2012 standard access charges to meet these requirements (however, station 
access is probably less of an issue in local bus service competition than the express coach 
case, given the use of on-street stops). A review of tendering procedures was commissioned 
by DfT in August 2013 and published in October (Department for Transport 2013).
The main issue outstanding is therefore the extent to which greater competition might be 
stimulated, and if so, whether it might result in effective price competition, as distinct from 
that based on frequency. The CC examined in great detail the issue of economies of scale, 
suggesting little evidence for this. Questions of depot provision to support operation outside 
the current operating area of a firm also emerge, as does the general unwillingness of 
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operators to engage in competition outside their established territories (one can permit 
competition to occur, but is there any means of compelling it?).
2.3The Transport Committee report
Following widespread industry reaction to the CC’s report, an inquiry was announced by the 
House of Commons Transport Committee, the report of which was published in September 
2012 (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2012a)5.
The committee took evidence from a number of witnesses, representing the main user 
groups, local authority and operating groups, trade unions, the Acting Senior Traffic 
Commissioner, consultants, and others. Its concluding session examined the Commissioner 
of Transport for TfL (in respect of the London experience), senior staff of the Competition 
Commission, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the DfT responsible for bus 
policy matters. Memoranda of evidence were also received from many other parties. The 
committee also visited Oxford to observe the voluntary partnership scheme there.
It found that witnesses representing local authorities, user groups and the industry were 
broadly supportive of the CC’s recommendations (notably greater use of multi-operator 
ticketing), but were sceptical of the benefits of competition per se, notably the outcomes of 
previous short-run competition which had produced unstable results with little benefit to 
users. On the whole, users appear more concerned with aspects such as reliability, 
frequency and value for money rather than competition as such. 
The Committee’s report made a number of recommendations, including that the Passenger 
Focus surveys (see section 4 below) should make more explicit comparisons between 
results for the major groups, and carry out surveys that allowed analysis of passenger 
satisfaction and competition at a local level (in issue arising from the CC’s report is that it 
might be reasonable to infer that satisfaction would be higher in corridors where competition 
occurs, for example on price. This would however require a much larger sample size and/or 
a sample focussed very clearly on a catchment area of such corridors). 
Other recommendations and conclusions in the Committee’s report addressed the issue of 
what can be done where a dominant operator provides unsatisfactory service, and the 
degree to which ‘head to head’ competition was realistic or desirable. It suggested that local 
authorities should be free to decide what was best for their areas on a basis of local 
evidence, including franchising/quality contracts. The DfT should monitor such moves, with 
their costs and outcomes. It supported partnership working, and wider introduction of multi-
operator tickets. It supported wider disclosure of information on deregistered services.  The 
Committee also noted that the CC’s studies had not included any comparative analysis of the 
bus industry in other countries.
The government’s response was published in November 2012 (House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 2012b). This broadly accepted some of the Committee’s findings, but 
indicated, for example, resource constraints on the scale of surveys that Passenger Focus 
could carry out.
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A further discussion of issues raised in the Committee’s report took place on 10 January 
2013, between members of the Committee and the then Transport Minister Norman Baker 
(who had earlier given evidence to the Committee). This examined in particular the possible 
case for quality contracts, and issues arising where a dominant operator provided 
unsatisfactory services (Cream 2013).
3 How appropriate is the focus on an overall rate of return on capital as a guide to 
setting policy? 
A central aspect of the Competition Commission’s case and ensuing ‘remedies’ is the losses 
to consumers resulting from ‘excessive’ returns on capital. However, this raises the question 
of how such returns were attained, and whether different implications for consumers thereby 
result. As indicated in the previous section, a high profit margin could simply be a result of 
exploiting a market with low short-run price elasticity despite the loss of ridership resulting 
(for example, using a simple linear -0.4 elasticity, a 10% price increase reduces demand by 
4%, but revenue rises by 5.6%). Hence, a low profit margin could be improved by raising 
fares. This would also raise returns on capital. However, consumer surplus would be 
transferred to producer surplus in the process.  A more positive approach would be that of an 
operator who improves service quality to increase ridership at the same revenue per trip, 
thus increasing total revenue and also profitability. In this section, a notional case study of 
two theoretical examples is considered, and then the extent to which observed outcomes 
illustrate such differences in practice. 
3.1 An illustrative case – Operator ‘P’ and Operator ‘Q’
Illustrative examples of two operators are considered here. Both commence from the same 
starting point of 1995, in which they carry 100 million passengers at an average revenue of 
£1 each. Total operating costs are £97.2m (of which £4.2m is historic depreciation), and 
hence an operating surplus is made of £2.8m, giving a 2.8% return on sales (corresponding 
to Earnings before Interest and Taxation, EBIT, a measure of performance commonly used 
in the industry). However, as indicated in section 1.3, this generates inadequate funds to 
replace assets on a like-for-like basis. However, the fleet is ageing, and each vehicle is 
valued at only £30,000. To get back to a 15 year replacement life, fleet renewal needs to be 
accelerated, and a better profit margin is needed to make up for inadequacies of historic 
depreciation of £4,000 per vehicle per annum (at a cost for new vehicles of £90,000 at that 
time, and a life of 15 years, £6,000 is required). Both operators have exhausted the obvious 
efficiency gains typical of the first phase of deregulation, hence a need to raise revenue to 
improve profit margins. 
Assets are valued at the written down value of the fleet (comprising 1050 vehicles), plus the 
depots which are worth £10m. If 55 million bus-km were run per annum, these data would 
correspond to 1.826 passengers boarding per bus-km, and a unit operating cost per bus-km 
of £1.76. Each vehicle would run 52,300 km per annum and carry 95,240 passenger trips. 
These data are broadly typical of the industry outside London at that time. 
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3.2 Operator strategies
Operator P simply raises prices by 1.5% p.a. in real terms. The cumulative effect over the 
period to 2008 is that demand falls from 100m to 91.79m trips, but revenue rises from £100m 
to £111.39m. Operating margins (even after allowing for higher depreciation charges on the 
newer vehicles) rise from 8.0% in 1995 to 11.10% in 2008. The value of the assets (allowing 
for straight-line depreciation on vehicles) rises from £41.50m in 1995 to £90.65m in 2008. 
The return on assets rises from 6.75% in 1995 to 13.65% in 2005, the latter broadly in line 
with the “excess returns” for large groups shown in the CC report.
Operator Q pursues a more positive approach, stimulating demand through improved service 
quality at the same aggregate vehicle-km: for example, through better marketing, improved 
reliability of service, customer-focussed driver training, pricing flexibility around the £1 
average figure, redeploying total bus-km to match demand more effectively, etc. Total 
passenger trips rise by 11.39%, and revenue by the same amount. Hence in 2005, both 
operators display the same total revenue and profitability.
However, implications for passengers are very different. In the case of operator P, trips have 
fallen by 8.21%, and each remaining trip pays a fare about 21% higher than in 1995. There is 
a shift along the demand curve, as would be shown in a standard consumer surplus diagram. 
Hence, there is a direct transfer of consumer surplus from these passengers to the operator 
of £20.54m in 1995. In addition, applying the ‘rule of half’ (i.e. assuming that the average loss 
to someone no longer travelling is half that to someone still traveling) results in a further loss 
of £0.86m, giving a total consumer surplus loss of £21.40m.
For operator Q, the effects may be represented by shift to the right (i.e. higher quality 
produces more trips at the same unit revenue). There is no loss of consumer surplus. If the 
demand curve is extrapolated upward and assumed to be linear, the ‘price’ at which the 
former demand level of 100m passenger trips would be found is £1.29. On a more tentative 
basis than the consumer surplus loss calculations, we can assume the existing users would 
also benefit from improved service quality (an inferred consumer surplus gain of £29m), plus 
‘rule of half’ gains to new users (a further £1.65m), giving a total gain of £30.65m. This 
calculation is dependent on the extent to which measures designed to attract additional 
ridership would also benefit existing users. This is clearly the case, for example, with 
improvements in service reliability, vehicle accessibility, passenger information, and staff 
training. However, measures taken purely to stimulate ridership through better marketing 
(such as the ‘telemarketing’ of Stagecoach) would not necessarily provide benefits to existing 
users. The consumer surplus gain would therefore represent an upper estimate of potential 
effects, but nonetheless contrasts sharply with the consumer surplus loss from fare increases 
by operator P.
This is, of course, a simplified example. Both operators would experience some external 
negative factors (such as rising car ownership) and positive ones (notably introduction of free 
concessionary travel, subject to the effect of compensation in lieu of direct passenger 
revenue on profit margins). In some respects, Operator P’s case could prove to be even 
worse, since medium-run elasticities are of greater magnitude than -0.4 (Balcombe et al 
2004), and hence the cumulative impact of the fare increase in the early years on final year 
ridership could be greater than assumed here. It is also reasonable to assume some 
increase in the absolute value of the short-run elasticity as absolute level of real fares rises. 
Given the poor loadings, the operator might well cut out some mileage, but this in turn would 
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have a ‘knock on’ effect on ridership also. In the case of operator Q, some increases in 
mileage might be needed to cope with demand growth which would then stimulate further 
growth and passenger benefits (such as reduced waiting time). Hence the compound 
differences between the two cases could diverge further than shown in the initial calculations.
3.3 Implications arising
The implications in terms of the Commission’s policies are very different for each operator. 
Clearly, in the case of P, there has been a direct transfer of consumer surplus from users, 
and urgent action could be needed to offset this. However, simply reducing P’s own surplus 
would not be an objective in its own right. For example, short-run competition from another 
operator paralleling existing journeys might divert some ridership, but unless increasing 
ridership by reducing fares or waiting times would not be necessarily transfer benefits to 
users.
For operator Q, one might see higher margins as a ‘reward’ for good service quality, 
especially if these were reflected in higher investment level rather than higher dividends. In 
the long run, one might have some concerns re sustained higher-than-average returns, but 
again the issue would be that of transferring the surplus to users, not reducing it for its own 
sake. 
Another interesting outcome is the extent to which the performance of each operator might 
attract competition. Clearly, if competition is to act as a ‘remedy’ where excessive profits at 
the users’ expense are generated, one might hope that competition would be more likely to 
arise in the case of operator ‘P’. However, as well as the high profit margin being attained by 
the incumbent, a newcomer would also be concerned about the absolute volume of ridership 
it could attract. For example, where a newcomer introduces a service parallel to a service 
currently operated by the incumbent operator, ‘Q’ might attract stronger competition than 
operator ‘P’, since it would have built up substantially higher ridership. If network size had 
remained unchanged, Q would be carrying about 21.4% more passengers per route than P. 
It is noteworthy, for example, that trentbarton, generally judged one of the more successful 
post-deregulation operators, with high ratings on Passenger Focus surveys, has attracted 
substantial direct competition, notably on the Nottingham - Derby corridor, whereas First 
Group (see further comments below) has not necessarily attracted much competition, even in 
areas where high fares are charged.
4. How far does this match observed patterns?
Within the Competition Commission’s report, the problems arising from the profit margins of 
the large groups are largely seen as an issue common to all the groups, but one could argue 
that major variations can be seen in their performance, not only in financial data which are 
already in the public domain, but also differences in ridership trends, and degree of user 
satisfaction. There is also evidence of differing investment levels.  Unfortunately, one cannot 
obtain a consistent series of published data on ridership, since the data published by DfT are 
aggregated at regional level, and do not refer to specific operators (although the local 
authority-based ‘trips per head per annum’ indicator does show ridership at a more local level 
and where one company is known to be dominant, serves as an indicator of their 
performance – for example, the very high ridership in Brighton and Hove, at c190 per head of 
population, the highest outside London within England, even in comparison with the large 
metropolitan areas). Unfortunately, this indicator is produced only for unitary and higher-tier 
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authorities, hence it is not possible to obtain it for second-tier authorities within larger areas 
(such as Oxford city within Oxfordshire). Technical press reports also indicate ridership 
trends for whole groups, and/or in different areas they serve, although these are dependent 
on willingness of operators to quote such data.
An indication of user satisfaction is given in the regular bus user surveys undertaken by 
Passenger Focus, a state-supported nationwide body which represents the interests of rail 
and bus users4. In addition to an on-going basic user satisfaction study (originally managed 
directly by DfT), which asks for ratings on a 0-10 scale for a range of indicators (and is 
published only in regional, aggregated form), Passenger Focus carry out specific local 
studies, examining users’ perceptions in named areas (and distinguishing between 
operators). A five-point scale is used, ranging from ‘very satisfied’ to ’very dissatisfied’ and 
‘satisfaction’ is expressed as the sum of the respondents reporting ‘very satisfied’ or 
‘satisfied’.  A number of major attributes are assessed separately, a particularly useful 
indicator being the ‘Value for Money’ (VfM) which effectively enables respondents to trade-off 
fares and service quality, rather than simply assess fare levels in isolation.
While less complex than some more sophisticated indicators developed by other researchers 
- for example    - the Passenger Focus scale has the merit of being easy to understand, for 
respondents, operators and policy-makers.
These surveys generally indicate a high level of satisfaction from bus users (albeit the views 
of non-users are excluded). In more recent surveys, data have been distinguished separately 
for different operators. In most cases this has only been for a limited period, so that only one 
(or sometimes two) observations are available for a specific operator in a specific area, and a 
series of data over a longer period is not available. However, marked variations can be seen, 
with high scores in particular for the Stagecoach and Go Ahead groups. Lower levels of 
satisfaction have been recorded for First and National Express.  In some areas, such as 
South Yorkshire, where two major operators run – First and Stagecoach - direct differences 
can be observed especially in the ‘VfM’ indicator. In some cases these have as far apart as 
25 percentage points (South Yorkshire) or 13 points (Greater Manchester) (Jack, 2013).
A substantial report was published in March 2013 (Passenger Focus 2013), covering 20 
regions in England (and two BRT schemes, assessed separately). It also contains explicit 
comparisons for four of the five largest groups on four key indicators, drawn from the sample 
in those same regions. At this aggregate level, differences are less extreme than in some 
specific cases cited above, but nonetheless a similar general pattern can be observed. On 
‘overall satisfaction’ Stagecoach scored highest at 86%, National Express lowest at 78%. On 
‘Value for Money’, scores were generally lower, but again Stagecoach scored highest, at 
59%, with First and Arriva both at 48%. On punctuality, Stagecoach attained 74% versus 
63% for First and 62% for National Express. Only two Go Ahead Group companies were in 
the areas sampled, and Passenger Focus did not quote overall figures for this group. 
However, a separate study carried out by Passenger Focus purely on Go Ahead Group 
companies in 2012 (Passenger Focus 2012) indicated high performance, with its subsidiaries 
averaging  89% for ‘overall satisfaction’ (higher than Stagecoach in 2013), although VfM (for 
fare-paying passengers) was lower than Stagecoach in 2013, at 52%
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There is also evidence from some areas of a growing divergence in price levels between 
major groups. For example, in Greater Manchester the previous PTE-owned fleet was split 
into northern and southern divisions, the north part eventually forming part of First Group and 
the southern part of Stagecoach. From a situation in which a common price had been 
charged for a weekly bus card, by January 2013, the price in the southern (Stagecoach) area 
was £12, and in the northern (First) £18, a 50% difference5, although should borne in mind 
that local economic conditions may be less favourable in north Manchester than the south 
(for example, higher unemployment could cause a loss of ridership, perhaps making it 
necessary for an operator to raise fares by a higher percentage to attain an adequate 
operating margin). This would be consistent with some element of the operator ‘P’ case in 
First’s behaviour, with successive year-on-year fare increases eventually producing a very 
large difference with an operator following a different policy.
Higher fare levels for First have also been reported in other areas it serves.  It should be 
emphasised at this point, that a major change has taken place in the last two-three years in 
senior management at First, with a very different policy now being adopted, the north 
Manchester weekly now being priced at £13 for example. A noteworthy case is the Bristol 
area, in which an extensive consultation was carried out with local users, followed by a 
decision by First to substantially reduce fares from 3 November 2013, with 90% of users 
paying, on average, 27% less for single fares, together with lower-priced day tickets and 30% 
discount card for those aged between 16 and 216.  [and Pax Focus results]
Statements from Stagecoach, issued in June 2013 for the year to 30 April 2013 (Stagecoach 
2013), highlight some of these factors. Figure 1 below shows the relationship between 
overall profitability (ROS) and user satisfaction, indicating that Stagecoach performs better 
than two other major groups on both indicators. Stagecoach attribute this to ’low fares, good 
quality, safe and reliable services’. Satisfaction scores are from the March 2013 Passenger 
Focus survey. The operating margin is that for its UK Bus (regional and London) services, 
after applying any unallocated group overheads proportionate to revenue.
Figure 1: Satisfaction and Profitability indicators in 2013 (source: Stagecoach Group)
Figure 2 below shows the relationship between ROS and investment, again indicating a 
positive correlation between Stagecoach’s higher profitability, and investment levels. The 
vertical axis shows capital expenditure as a percentage of revenue, and the horizontal axis 
the operating margin.  Note that some capital expenditure will of course be funded from 
historic depreciation, but a higher margin covers the difference between historical and 
current cost depreciation (as discussed earlier in this paper), and also new investment (such 
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as ticketing systems). UK bus (regional and London) additions to property, plant and 
equipment over the last reported five years have been measured as a percentage of revenue 
and then compared to the most recently reported operating margin (after applying any 
unallocated group overheads proportionate to revenue).
Figure 2. Profitability and Investment in 2013 (source: Stagecoach Group)
5. Implications for policy
Such differences point to policies that might vary according the performance of the dominant 
operator in each area, rather than a common approach over the whole country. Where 
performance is ‘good’ (in terms of operator profitability and ridership/user satisfaction) there 
would be little need for intervention. Conversely, where the operator was clearly charging 
high fares and offering poor services, much stronger action might be justified. This might 
point to a selective application of the ‘quality contract’ approach, or other measures designed 
to improve the performance of an unsatisfactory incumbent.  There seems to be little 
evidence that smaller operators would be willing to take on the challenge on sufficient scale 
to have much impact.
An associated issue might be whether high profits were being reinvested, or distributed as 
unduly high returns to shareholders. Again, a stronger case for action would apply in the 
latter. This would imply some regulatory role in monitoring profitability and its applications 
(akin to regulated industries in water, and energy) rather than the approach traditionally 
taken by the Traffic Commissioners (especially since their loss of power over fare levels).
Such a selective approach to application of competition policy could be seen as at odds with 
the concept of a ‘Market Investigation’. However, if one considers enquiries into mergers by 
competition authorities and the recommendations subsequently produced, these are clearly 
seen as unique to particular circumstances.
Two further issues arise:
(a) The degree to which sustained ‘on the road’ competition may be feasible is probably very 
limited in most areas, but one can foresee scope for a period of competition in which a 
successful ‘newcomer’ (perhaps a large group already operating elsewhere) eventually 
displaces the incumbent, and offers a better service to users than would otherwise be the 
case.
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(b) How far is management behaviour influenced only by competition (or threat thereof), 
and/or regulatory action?   This could, for example, apply to pricing. Is there is an effect 
arising from comparisons of performance, and pressure of public opinion? The Passenger 
Focus data certainly appears to have concentrated minds and encouraged a changed 
approach, quite apart from the degree of direct competition.
Some interesting parallels may be drawn with two other papers in the same workshop 
session.  Preston and Almutairi (2014) carried out an aggregate analysis of the London area 
compared with the entire deregulated sector in mainland Britain. This indicates a positive 
consumer surplus outcome in the London case, but a negative consumer surplus outcome 
for the deregulated regions. In contrast, I am suggesting that a crude disaggregation within 
the deregulated regions by operator groups indicates that two groups – Go Ahead and 
Stagecoach – generally display a positive outcome for users. They accounted for about 28% 
of industry turnover outside London in the in 2008/09, part of the 71% represented by the five 
largest groups in aggregate (Competition Commission 2011b, table 2.14). A more detailed 
analysis by Cowie (2014) assesses performance for a sample of 49 individual companies, 
using financial data from TAS, and the Passenger Focus data for passenger satisfaction 
ratings, from which five clusters of performance can be identified. He indicates that two of 
these, representing about 29% of the cases considered, can be seen as ‘consumer-centric’. 
This is broadly equivalent to the percentage share of Go Ahead and Stagecoach within the 
aggregate total, although it does not of course follow that all the individual subsidiaries of 
those two groups in the sample examined by Cowie would fall within the two most positive 
clusters (and likewise, these clusters may include some subsidiaries of the other groups, 
and/or individual companies outwith the five major groups).
We may thus conclude that, while, in aggregate, the performance outside London has been 




Trends in Britain indicate that the bus industry recovered from a low level of profitability in the 
first phase of deregulation, to a much higher level in the second phase, notably among the 
five largest groups. This has enabled improved rates of fleet replacement, for example. 
However, both the experience of coach deregulation, and that of local bus, suggests the 
theoretical scope for extensive competition from numerous small operators may be limited, 
and that in practice most competition occurs between larger firms. The degree of ‘on the 
road’ price competition in practice seems very limited.
The review by the Competition Commission identifies concerns regarding possible 
‘excessive’ profit levels, and a number of remedies are proposed by the Commission to deal 
with this. However, it can be shown through the two illustrative case studies in this paper that 
very different outcomes  could arise from the same starting point, both giving the same 
‘excessive’ returns on capital, but with radically different outcomes in terms of consumer  
surplus changes and ridership. This suggests that an approach specific to each large group 
would be appropriate. There is also evidence that higher profit levels can be associated with 
higher user satisfaction, and higher investment levels. While direct competition may be a 
means of reducing excessive price levels, there is also evidence of management behaviour 
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being influenced by systematic comparisons within the industry, and public opinion. 
Competition may be a means of changing price behaviour, but not the only means.
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Footnotes
1 Note that these estimates were based on published year-by-year population estimates, The 
2011 census indicates a somewhat greater growth than previously estimated, and hence this 
would form a slightly greater contribution to overall ridership growth, but does not radically 
affect the conclusions then reached.
2 All figures at 2012/13 prices. Source: DfT Statistics Table BUS0502.
3 Source: DfT Statistics Table BUS0408b
4 As part of Thredbo 13, a presentation was made by the County Council and two main 
operators involved about the scheme, followed by a technical visit (on website?).
5
 The author of this paper was one of two specialist advisers to the Committee enquiry. It 
should be stressed, however, that all views expressed in this paper are those of the author 
alone, and should not be taken as representing those of the Committee.
6 For convenience, most calculations are shown to two decimal places.
4 For further details, see their website <passengerfocus.org.uk>
5 Coach and Bus Week 2 January 2013, p17
6 Passenger Transport 11 October 2013, p6
Where specific sources are not shown for statistics quoted, these are taken from those 
published annually by the Department for Transport (DfT).
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